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On August 7, 2008, Georgian forces launched attacks into South Ossetia, in-cluding against Russian troops who were in the breakaway region as
“peacekeepers.” The jus ad bellum issues surrounding the conflict remain contro-
versial.1 However, it is incontrovertible that once Georgian and Russian forces
became embroiled in hostilities against each other, an international armed conflict
subject to the jus in bello (international humanitarian law (IHL) or the law of
armed conflict) had begun.
During the conflict, numerous defacement and denial of service cyber opera-
tions were directed against Georgian entities.2 The cyber targets included the
websites of the President; Parliament; Foreign Affairs, Defence and Education
ministries; domestic and foreign media; banks; and private Internet servers and
blogs. For instance, defacement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs website in-
cluded the posting of a collage of photos of Adolf Hitler and Georgian President
Mikheil Saakashvili. Similarly, the site of the National Bank of Georgia was re-
placed with one depicting twentieth-century dictators together with Saakashvili.
On average, each operation lasted two hours. Although no physical damage or in-
juries were reported, the disruption of services proved severe. In particular, the
Georgian government found itself unable to broadcast information about the
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conflict and Georgian banks went off-line, as a self-imposed precautionary mea-
sure, for ten days.
The identity of the originators of the operations remains uncertain. As with
those against Estonia the previous year, most of the operations were traceable to
Russia but there was no conclusive evidence that the Russian government con-
ducted the attacks or was otherwise involved therein. While certain of them were
traceable to Russian government computers, the possibility that they were
“pwned,” that is, taken over for the purpose of mounting attacks, cannot be ruled
out. Nevertheless, that a website containing potential Georgian cyber targets and
malicious software, StopGeorgia.ru, came on line within hours of the commence-
ment of hostilities aroused suspicions of governmental involvement.
Foreign governments and private sources promptly assisted the Georgians.
Google provided hosting services for Georgian sites, an important contribution in
light of its advanced security. The Georgian Ministry of Defence and Ministry of
Foreign Affairs websites were moved to US and Estonian servers, while the Polish
President made his website available for posting Georgian government informa-
tion about the conflict. Despite these efforts, the attacks significantly disrupted the
operation of the Georgian cyber infrastructure.
As the Georgia case illustrates, cyber operations have become embedded in
modern warfare. This article examines three central IHL issues raised by cyber op-
erations mounted during armed conflicts: the principle of distinction, direct par-
ticipation by civilians in hostilities and classification of conflict. It makes no effort
to explore the jus ad bellum, which is addressed by companion contributions to this
volume of the International Law Studies. As the normative architecture governing
cyber operations remains indistinct, it must be cautioned that the conclusions
drawn are those of the author alone and somewhat tentative. However, attention is
drawn to the ongoing efforts of a group of international experts working under the
auspices of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence to craft a
Manual on the International Law of Cyber Warfare.3 Said manual, albeit soft law,
will help clear much of the legal fog of cyber warfare.
Cyber Operations and the Principle of Distinction
Article 48 of Additional Protocol I requires the parties to a conflict to “at all times
distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian
objects and military objectives and accordingly direct their operations only against
military objectives.”4 In doing so, it restates the customary law principle of distinc-
tion, which has been labeled by the International Court of Justice as one of two
“cardinal” principles of IHL (the other being the prohibition of unnecessary
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suffering).5 It is incontrovertible that the principle applies to cyber operations con-
ducted during an armed conflict.
The devil, however, is in the details. Note the term “operation” in Article 48. Its
use would at first glance appear to prohibit any cyber activity directed against civil-
ians or civilian objects. Yet operations aimed at the civilian population are not un-
common during armed conflict, the paradigmatic example being psychological
operations, which are generally deemed lawful unless they cause physical harm or
human suffering.
Subsequent articles resident in Additional Protocol I shed light on the founda-
tional intent of the principle of distinction. In particular, they “operationalize”
Article 48 by setting forth restrictions, prohibitions and requirements that are typ-
ically framed in terms of “attacks.” Article 51.1 exemplifies this operationaliza-
tion. It states that the “civilian population and individual civilians shall enjoy
general protection against dangers arising from military operations,” but goes on
to note that “[t]o give effect to this protection, the following rules . . . shall be
observed in all circumstances.” The rules include the prohibitions on making
the civilian population or individual civilians the “object of attack,”6 conducting
“indiscriminate attacks,”7 and engaging in “attacks against the civilian population
or civilians by way of reprisal.”8 Article 51 also illustrates the notion of “indiscrim-
inate” by reference to two types of operations. The first is “an attack . . . which
treats as a single military objective a number of clearly separated and distinct mili-
tary objectives located in a city, town, village or other area containing a similar
concentration of civilians or civilian objects.”9 The second is an expression of the
principle of proportionality, which bars “an attack which may be expected to
cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects,
or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and
direct military advantage anticipated.”10
Other articles take the same approach. Article 52, the property counterpart to
Article 51’s protection of civilians, forbids making civilian items the “object of at-
tack” and limits attacks to military objectives.11 Article 54 notes that it is “prohib-
ited to attack, destroy, remove or render useless objects indispensible to the
survival of the civilian population,”12 whereas Article 55 prohibits “[a]ttacks
against the natural environment by way of reprisals.”13 Article 56 provides that
“[w]orks or installations containing dangerous forces . . . shall not be made the ob-
ject of attack, even where these objects are military objectives, if such attack may
cause the release of dangerous forces and consequent severe loss among the civilian
population.”14 It further provides that “[o]ther military objectives located at or in
the vicinity of these works or installations shall not be made the object of attack” if
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A central component of the principle of distinction is that “[i]n the conduct of
military operations, constant care shall be taken to spare the civilian population, ci-
vilians and civilian objects.”16 Despite the reference to “operations,” the norma-
tively meaningful aspects of the attendant requirements are set forth in terms of
attacks. Indeed, the article itself is titled “precautions in attack.” According to the
article, “those who plan or decide upon an attack” are required to “do everything
feasible to verify that the objectives to be attacked are neither civilians nor civilian
objects and are not subject to special protection,”17 “take all feasible precautions in
the choice of means and methods of attack” in order to minimize civilian harm18
and “refrain from deciding to launch an attack” that may be expected to violate the
rule of proportionality.19 “Attacks must be canceled or suspended if it becomes ap-
parent” that the intended target is not a military objective or if the strike would run
counter to proportionality limitations,20 and “effective advance warning shall be
given of attacks which may affect the civilian population” should circumstances
permit.21 When considering possible targets, and choice is possible between them
without forfeiting military advantage, “the objective to be selected shall be that the
attack on which may be expected to cause the least danger to civilian lives and civil-
ian objects.”22 None of the provisions of Article 57 may be interpreted as “authoriz-
ing any attacks against the civilian population, civilians or civilian objects.”23 The
focus on attacks appears again in the following article, which imposes an obligation
on defending parties to take “precautions against the effect of attacks” in order to
safeguard civilians and civilian objects.24
The emphasis on restricting military operations by reference to attacks appears
repeatedly in other chapters of Additional Protocol I. For example, medical units
are not to be made the “object of attack,” may not be used to “shield military objec-
tives from attack” and must be located, whenever possible, so that “attacks against
military objectives do not imperil their safety.”25 Prohibitions exist on making
those hors de combat due to wounds or surrender and individuals parachuting
from a disabled aircraft an object of attack.26 Combatants are obligated to “distin-
guish themselves from the civilian population while they are engaged in an attack
or in a military operation preparatory to attack,”27 and “[i]t is prohibited . . . to
attack, by any means whatsoever, non-defended localities.”28
As should be apparent, the reference to operations in Article 48 must be inter-
preted as bearing on a particular type of operation, an attack. Operations not
amounting to an attack, such as psychological operations, are generally accepted as
lawful.
But what is an attack? Article 49 of Additional Protocol I, in a provision that cer-
tainly reflects customary understandings of the term, defines attacks as “acts of vio-
lence against the adversary, whether in offence or in defence.”29 The linkage between
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operations and violence is further revealed in the International Committee of the
Red Cross’s (ICRC) Commentary to Article 48, which notes that “the word opera-
tion should be understood in the context of the whole section; it refers to military
operations during which violence is used.”30 That Additional Protocol I and its of-
ficial commentary define both operations and attacks by reference to the notion of
violence further strengthens the conclusion that application of the principle of dis-
tinction generally depends on an attack having occurred and that an attack is an ac-
tion during armed conflict that is violent in nature.
Since the plain text of Article 49 appears to require a violent act for qualification
as an attack, by a strict textual interpretation, non-kinetic operations, i.e., opera-
tions which themselves do not comprise physical force, would be excluded. This
appeared to have been the prevailing interpretation at the time the Additional Pro-
tocol was drafted. As noted in Bothe, Partsch and Solf’s (all involved in drafting the
Protocol) respected commentary on the provision: “The term ‘acts of violence’ de-
notes physical force. Thus, the concept of ‘attacks’ does not include dissemination
of propaganda, embargoes, or other non-physical means of psychological or eco-
nomic warfare.”31 Similarly, the ICRC Commentary on Article 49 suggests that “the
term ‘attack’ means ‘combat action.’”32
It must be remembered that although treaties are to be interpreted “in accor-
dance with the ordinary meaning to be given to their terms,” said interpretations
must be made in “context and in the light of [their] object and purpose.”33 At the
time Additional Protocol I was drafted, cyber operations did not exist; virtually all
military “attacks” employed means that released kinetic energy, as through an
explosion or the force of a bullet striking an individual. While the text of Article 49
is framed in terms of the nature of the act amounting to an attack, the drafters
must have been primarily concerned with its consequences for the civilian popu-
lation. Protection of the population was the Protocol’s central “object and pur-
pose” with regard to the rules of targeting. “Violence” merely constituted useful
prescriptive shorthand for use in rules designed to shield the population from
harmful effects. Despite being styled as act-based norms (violence), they are in fact
consequence-based.
The text of Additional Protocol I’s various rules developing the principle of dis-
tinction supports this conclusion. Article 51 sets out the general premise that civil-
ians “enjoy general protection against dangers arising from military operations”
and bars those acts or threats of violence “the primary purpose of which is to
spread terror among the civilian population.”34 It also frames the principle of pro-
portionality by reference to expected “incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civil-
ians, damage to civilian objects,” a formula repeated in Article 57.35 During
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and means of warfare in order to minimize “incidental loss of civilian life, injury to
civilians and damage to civilian objects,”36 the issuance of warnings if an attack
may “affect the civilian population,”37 and choosing among potential targets in
part based on the goal of causing “the least danger to civilian lives and to civilian
objects.”38 With regard to aerial and naval operations, attacks must take all reason-
able precautions “to avoid losses of civilian lives and damage to civilian objects.”39
In other articles, the environment is protected against “widespread, long-term and
severe damage”40 and dams, dykes and nuclear electrical generating stations are
protected out of concern for “severe losses among the civilian population.”41
As these examples clearly illustrate, it is not the violence of the act that consti-
tutes the condition precedent to limiting the occurrence of an attack, but the vio-
lence of the ensuing result. In other words, the legal prohibition is on attacking,
rather than targeting, protected persons and objects. This interpretation should
not be considered novel, for it has always been the case that operations employing
biological contagions or chemicals have been characterized as attacks, even though
non-kinetic in nature, because their consequences could prove harmful, even le-
thal. Thus, Bothe, Partsch and Solf, despite the extract above from their classic
work, correctly defined attacks in a consequence-based fashion by asserting that
the term referred to “those aspects of military operations that most directly affect
the safety of the civilian population and the integrity of civilian objects.”42
Cyber operations can unquestionably generate such consequences even though
they launch no physical force themselves. For instance, a cyber operation against
an air traffic control system would place aircraft, whether military or civilian, at
risk. Or one targeting a dam could result in the release of waters, thereby endanger-
ing persons and property downstream. In neither case would the actual act be
destructive, but in both the consequences would be. Referring back to the require-
ment of violence, and its development in Additional Protocol I, cyber operations
can therefore qualify as “attacks,” even though they are not themselves “violent,”
because they have “violent consequences.” A cyber operation, like any other opera-
tion, is an attack when resulting in death or injury of individuals, whether civil-
ians or combatants, or damage to or destruction of objects, whether military
objectives or civilian objects.
A cyber operation that is intended, but fails, to generate such results would be
encompassed in the concept, in much the same way that a rifle shot that misses its
target is nevertheless an attack in IHL. Similarly, one expected to cause collateral
damage to civilian objects or incidental harm to civilians would qualify, even if no
harm befell the military objective targeted. This latter point is somewhat unique to
cyber operations since lawful kinetic operations are typically intended to cause the
requisite harm to the target, with incidental harm to civilians being a by-product of
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the attack, as with civilians caught within the blast radius of a bomb employed
against a military facility. In a cyber operation, however, the target may not be
physically harmed at all, yet the operation could nevertheless result in collateral
damage or incidental injury, as in simply opening the floodgates of a dam.
By this interpretation, the operations against Georgia were not attacks and
therefore not unlawful under international humanitarian law. They involved dis-
ruption and defacement, but no physical harm to objects or injury to persons.
There is an alternative approach, one suggested by Dr. Knut Dörmann of the
ICRC’s legal division.43 Dörmann points to the definition of military objectives in
Article 52.2 of Additional Protocol I, one generally accepted as the correct articula-
tion of customary law, as support for his position: “military objectives are limited
to those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective
contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or
neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military ad-
vantage.”44 Noting that the definition includes “neutralization,” he suggests that
“[i]t is irrelevant whether an object is disabled through destruction or in any other
way.”45 In doing so, he dispenses with the requirement for damage, destruction,
death or injury for an action to qualify as an attack. Consequently, the prohibition
on “attacking” civilians and civilian objects extends to cyber operations “targeting”
them. By the Dörmann approach, many of the cyber operations conducted against
Georgia would qualify as “attacks” and those targeting civilian systems would be
unlawful under IHL.
The approach is not unreasonable in light of the severe non-physical harm that
can be caused by cyber operations. It responds to concerns that the other approach
is under-inclusive. However, Dörmann’s poses the opposite risk, that of over-
inclusivity. It would encompass, for instance, all denial of service attacks, including
those in which mere inconvenience resulted, as in the case of blocking a television
broadcast or university website. State practice provides no support for the notion
that causation of inconvenience is intended to be prohibited in IHL. On the con-
trary, inconvenience and interference with the daily lives of civilians are a frequent
result of armed conflict and psychological operations directed against the civilian
population are common. Dörmann is to be commended for identifying the unsat-
isfactory result of limiting “attacks” to those operations causing death, injury,
damage or destruction, but his proposed remedy goes too far.
It also relies on law that is not directly on point. Military objectives are those objects
that may be attacked. But the preliminary question is whether an attack is being
conducted or contemplated. Only when that question is answered in the affirma-
tive does the definition of military objective come into play. The issue with regard
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what consequences. Moreover, the drafters envisioned “neutralization” in the con-
text of an attack. The term was included to encompass cases involving “an attack
for the purpose of denying the use of an object to the enemy without necessarily de-
stroying it.”46 Examples include using landmines to render an area of land impass-
able or firing antipersonnel munitions at enemy surface-to-air missile sites to force
gun crews to take cover while an air attack against other targets is under way.47
By the principle of distinction, civilian objects may not be attacked during
armed conflict. With respect to cyber operations, one unsettled issue is whether
data resident in computers comprise an “object.” The implications of the answer
are momentous. To the extent they do, direct operations against civilian data
would constitute an unlawful attack on a civilian object. Further, any harm caused
to civilian data during a cyber attack on a lawful military objective would have to be
considered in the proportionality calculation and when determining the nature of
the precautions required during attack.
No definitive answer to this question exists. It would appear overbroad to
characterize all data as “objects.” Surely a cyber operation that deletes an innocu-
ous e-mail or temporarily disrupts a television broadcast does not amount to an
unlawful attack on a civilian object. For instance, it is well-settled that an operation
employing electronic warfare to disrupt civilian media is lawful. It would make no
sense to distinguish between such an operation and a cyber operation that destroys
data to achieve precisely the same result.
Absent an agreed-upon interpretation in the cyber context, it is perhaps best to
tread lightly in characterizing data as an object. Doing so might be appropriate in
two situations. First, some data are directly transferable into tangible objects. For
instance, banking account data are designed to be immediately transformable into
money at an automatic teller machine. To the extent the data are destroyed, so too
is the tangible equivalent, the money. There are few examples of such data. Second,
some data have intrinsic value. An example would be digital art. If the data are de-
stroyed, the art is as well. Presumably, it should be protected as civilian property
and in some cases as cultural property. But again, such cases are rare.
Generally, data should not be characterized as an object in itself. Rather, the de-
terminative question is whether the consequences attendant to its destruction in-
volve the requisite level of harm to protected physical objects or persons. If so, the
cyber operation constitutes an unlawful attack.
Cyber operations also bear on certain issues regarding application of the concept
of military objectives. Networking means that there is a much higher likelihood
that cyber systems will be dual-use (used for both military and civilian purposes),
and thereby qualify as military objectives. Similarly, military reliance on software
and hardware produced for the civilian population arguably renders facilities
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that produce them lawfully targetable war-supporting military objectives. And,
since cyber systems are essential to the economy, certain of them may constitute
war-sustaining objects, which the United States, as distinct from most other coun-
tries, characterizes as military objectives.48
The cyber operations against Georgia illustrate these points. In no case did the
operations qualify as “attacks” under IHL, since no physical damage or injury re-
sulted. But assuming solely for the sake of analysis that they did, some, such as
those against Ministry of Defence servers, would have been lawful as directed
against military objectives (although the hacktivists enjoyed no belligerent right to
engage in hostilities in the first place). Others, such as those targeting the Ministry
of Education and media facilities, would have violated IHL proscriptions.
Additionally, the operations against Georgia illustrate two practical aspects of
cyber operations. First, it is likely that attackers will target “soft sites,” that is, sites
that are not well-secured. The most vulnerable are those in the civilian or non-
security governmental sectors. In future conflicts, attacks on civilian cyber targets
are therefore highly likely. Second, the attacks on the banking system illustrate the
appeal of targeting objects that might fall into the contentious “war-sustaining”
category. For instance, it would be simpler and less risky to undermine a State’s oil
export capacity with cyber attacks that disrupt storage and distribution than to
physically destroy the facilities and the transportation links upon which export de-
pends. This is especially so when a State is capable of effectively defending against
traditional kinetic attacks.
Cyber Operations and Direct Participation in Hostilities
Those who qualify as combatants enjoy the belligerent right of engaging in hostili-
ties; no reason exists to distinguish cyber from kinetic military operations in this
regard. However, cyber operations do present some difficulty as to application of
the rules regarding direct participation by civilians in hostilities. According to
Article 51.3 of Additional Protocol I, “civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded
by this Section [which addresses the conduct of hostilities], unless and for such
time as they take a direct part in hostilities.” A comparable provision exists for
non-international armed conflict, and the notion is undoubtedly customary in
nature.49 The consequence of the rule is that civilians may be targeted while they
directly participate in hostilities. Additionally, such direct participants do not fac-
tor into either the proportionality analysis or precautions in attack requirements.
The question, then, is when do civilians who participate in cyber, as distinct
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Analysis begins by determining whether the individuals concerned qualify as
members of the armed forces. If so, the direct participation rules do not apply since
they may be targeted directly even when not participating in hostilities. In its Inter-
pretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities, the ICRC has in-
cluded organized armed groups belonging to a party to the conflict in the category
of armed forces.50 Although the Guidance has proven controversial in other re-
spects,51 consensus existed among the experts convened to develop the product
that it was appropriate to treat organized armed groups in the same manner as the
armed forces for the purposes of targeting law.
But when do hackers and non-military groups engaging in cyber operations
qualify as organized armed groups? By definition, an organized armed group must
be both organized and armed. With regard to the former criterion, the most trou-
blesome question is whether a group may be “organized virtually.” In the virtual
domain, groups exist whose members never have any physical contact. Such
groups have many purposes—social, educational, financial, charitable and so
forth. In fact, it is not rare for dispersed military personnel to organize themselves
virtually, as in the case of intelligence sharing.
IHL does not develop the notion of organization to the degree necessary to
come to definitive conclusions regarding virtual organization. The ICRC’s Com-
mentary to Additional Protocol I notes that
[t]he term “organized” is obviously rather flexible, as there are a large number of de-
grees of organization. In the first place, this should be interpreted in the sense that the
fighting should have a collective character, be conducted under proper control and ac-
cording to rules, as opposed to individuals operating in isolation with no correspond-
ing preparation or training.52
Drawing on this definition, at one end of the continuum would be those “groups”
consisting of autonomous actors who are simply all targeting a State, perhaps in
response to a broad call to do so from one or more sources. They do not operate
under the direction of a particular individual nor does the group have any formal
organizational structure. These groups cannot be deemed to be organized, and,
therefore, individuals involved therein remain civilians subject to the rules of di-
rect participation.
At the other end are those who act collectively and cooperatively. Albeit virtual,
an online group may have a defined command structure and coordinate its
activities—for instance, by allocating cyber targets, developing and sharing hacker
tools, cooperating in identifying target vulnerabilities and conducting postattack
98
Cyber Operations and the Jus in Bello: Key Issues
Vol 87.ps
C:\_WIP\_Blue Book\_Vol 87\_Ventura\Vol 87.vp
Friday, June 10, 2011 9:03:11 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
damage assessments. There is little justification for excluding groups of this nature
from “armed forces” on the basis of organization.
A possible counterargument is that the requirement of organization is intended
to allow for enforcement of IHL. However, such an assertion confuses a require-
ment of organization for the purposes of prisoner of war status and for qualifica-
tion as a party to the conflict with the norms applicable to targeting. As noted in the
Interpretive Guidance,
it would contradict the logic of the principle of distinction to place irregular armed
forces under the more protective legal regime afforded to the civilian population
merely because they fail to . . . conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and
customs of war. Therefore, even under the terms of the Hague Regulations and the
Geneva Conventions, all armed actors showing a sufficient degree of military organiza-
tion and belonging to a party to the conflict must be regarded as part of the armed
forces of that party.53
The difficult case lies between these extremes, that of an informal grouping of
individuals who act with shared purpose. For instance, they access a common
website containing tools and vulnerable targets but do not coordinate their attacks.
Whether a group of this nature meets the organization criterion should depend on
such context-specific factors as the existence of a formal or informal leadership en-
tity directing the group’s activities in a general sense, identifying potential targets
and maintaining an inventory of effective hacker tools. In most cases, collective ac-
tion alone would not satisfy the organization criterion. However, as activities be-
gan to resemble those of a cooperative group, it is increasingly likely that States
would treat said group as an “armed force,” rather than a collection of civilian
direct participants.
An organized group must also be “armed” to qualify as an armed force. The log-
ical construction of “armed” is that the group carries out “attacks,” as that term is
understood in IHL. After all, while certain members of the armed forces, or even
certain components thereof, may have no “violent” function, the concept of armed
forces makes no sense in the absence of a group purpose of violence. This interpre-
tation is further supported by the notion of “combatants” (who enjoy the belliger-
ent privilege of attacking lawful targets) since they are also defined as members of
the armed forces.54 Without a group purpose of engaging in attacks, whether cyber
or kinetic, the members of an organized virtual group remain civilians to whom the
rules of direct participation apply. Accordingly, a group that conducts cyber opera-
tions not amounting to attacks (whether directed at military or civilian targets) is
but a collection of civilians. To the extent the activities of individual members of
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course, the reach of the adjective “armed” depends on the interpretation adopted
vis-à-vis the term “attack.”
The Interpretive Guidance adds two qualifiers to the notion of organized armed
groups, both of which have proven controversial. First, in order to be treated as the
armed forces, the group must “belong to a party to the conflict,” which requires “at
least a de facto relationship” between the group and a party to the conflict.55 The re-
lationship can be either declared or “expressed through tacit agreement or conclu-
sive behaviour that makes it clear for which party the group is fighting.”56 This
requirement has correctly been criticized on the basis that the critical issue in tar-
geting is not the entity for whom the potential target is fighting, but rather against
whom that group is engaged in hostilities. However, assuming for the sake of anal-
ysis that the requirement applies, it would exclude those organized armed groups
in an international armed conflict that might be directing cyber attacks against one
of the parties for reasons other than support of the opposing party. According to
the ICRC, such attacks might nevertheless amount to a separate non-international
armed conflict between the group and the target State, although this approach has
equally been the subject of criticism.57 Presumably, the criterion would also ex-
clude patriotic hacker groups unaffiliated with one of the belligerent parties, even if
conducting cyber attacks for its benefit, because the group’s activities would lack
the “agreement” of that party and its actions would in no other way be attributable
to the party under the law of State responsibility.58
The second qualifier found in the Interpretive Guidance is that only members of
an organized armed group who have a “continuous combat function” qualify as
members of the armed forces for targeting purposes.59 A continuous combat func-
tion is a duty that would meet the requirements of direct participation if the indi-
vidual concerned was not a group member. Whether group members engaged in
cyber operations have a continuous combat function depends on application of the
direct participation criteria set forth below.
This criterion is controversial, with critics arguing that it affords greater protec-
tion to members of organized armed groups, who enjoy no right to engage in hos-
tilities, than official members of the armed forces, who do.60 As a general matter the
criterion is no more compelling in the cyber context than in that of physical opera-
tions. This is so because it derives from concern over the possible difficulty of dis-
tinguishing group members from civilians on the battlefield.61 This prospect is
especially likely during cyber operations, in which the identity of those who have
launched an operation may be uncertain or where the military and civilian cyber
communities share networks and transmission assets. Yet, difficult as distinction
may sometimes be, IHL already contains a presumption of civilian status in the
case of doubt, thereby obviating the need to impose the continuous combat
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function criterion.62 That presumption would apply equally to those engaging in
cyber hostilities.
In the case of Georgia, there appear to have been no organized armed cyber
groups. The attacks do not seem to have been coordinated, nor is there any com-
pelling evidence of an overarching group structure. Further, the attacks were not
“armed” in the sense that they did not cause physical damage to property or injury
to individuals. Therefore, individuals engaged in conducting them would at most
have qualified as direct participants in hostilities, who may have been targeted for
such time as they directly participated.
The key issues regarding direct participation surround 1) the nature of direct
participation and 2) the duration of the “for such time” window. The Interpretive
Guidance suggests three cumulative constitutive elements that must be present be-
fore an act amounts to direct, as distinct from indirect, participation in hostilities.
First, the act must “be likely to adversely affect the military operations or military
capacity of a party to an armed conflict, or, alternatively, to inflict death, injury or
destruction on persons or objects protected against direct attack” (threshold of
harm). Second, “there must be a direct causal link between the act and the harm
likely to result either from that act, or from a coordinated military operation of
which that act constitutes an integral part” (direct causation). Finally, the act must
be specifically designed to “directly cause the required threshold of harm in support
of a party to the conflict and to the detriment of another” (belligerent nexus).63 In
the cyber context, any act that directly impedes a belligerent’s military operations
or capabilities or constitutes an attack on protected persons or objects would qual-
ify as direct participation so long as a nexus existed between the act and the armed
conflict. Examples would include cyber military intelligence gathering, disrupting
enemy cyber networks and manipulating data in the enemy’s military systems.
These requirements are generally deemed acceptable, although disagreement
does exist at their margins.64 For instance, it has been suggested that the “thresh-
old of harm” criterion be extended to include operations designed to enhance
one’s own capabilities. An example would be developing cyber defenses or identi-
fying cyber vulnerabilities in military cyber systems. The second element, causal-
ity, is equally necessary, but many critics of the Guidance took issue with its
example of assembling improvised explosive devices as indirect causation. Similar
objections would be raised if the analogous case of developing software specific to
a particular cyber operation or enemy system were characterized as indirect, vice
direct, causation.
The major issue presented by the Interpretive Guidance centered on the meaning
of the phrase “for such time,” referring to the period during which a direct partici-
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controversy, with critics alleging that it created a “revolving door.”65 In other
words, while a direct participant is deploying to and from an operation, he may be
attacked. However, once he successfully returns home he regains the full immunity
from attack that civilians enjoy, at least until such time as he deploys again to di-
rectly participate in hostilities. Although the ICRC has argued that this dynamic is
not a malfunction of IHL,66 critics point out that it creates an imbalance between
the direct participant and the member of the regular armed forces, since the latter is
open to attack at any time based solely on his status. In the view of the critics, these
individuals should be deemed to be directly participating for such time as they reg-
ularly engage in acts of hostilities; there should be no periods of immunity from at-
tack between the qualifying acts.
Cyber operations bring this issue into even greater focus. First, there may be
no “deployment” at all since only a computer, and not proximity to the target, is
required to mount the operations. The restrictive interpretation of the for such
time criterion would suggest that the direct participant can only be attacked while
actually launching the operation. This is problematic in that many cyber opera-
tions last mere minutes, perhaps only seconds. Such a requirement would effec-
tively extinguish the right to strike at direct participants. Moreover, the effect of a
cyber operation may be long-delayed, as in the case of a surreptitiously emplaced
logic bomb. Would the target of such an operation only be entitled to attack the
direct participant while the logic bomb is being emplaced? The problem is that the
very point of these operations is to avoid detection. Therefore, from a practical per-
spective, there would appear to be no window of opportunity for the victim of an
attack to respond. In the cyber conflict environment, therefore, the only reason-
able interpretation of “for such time” is that it encompasses the entire period dur-
ing which the direct cyber participant is engaging in repeated cyber operations.
Cyber Operations as Armed Conflict
Cyber operations are a particularly attractive means of targeting an opponent, for
the technology necessary to conduct them is cheap and accessible. In particular,
they represent an effective method for a weaker State to strike at a technologically
more advanced, and therefore more vulnerable, adversary. But do cyber operations
comprise “armed conflict,” as that term is used in IHL? This is “the” threshold
question, for IHL does not apply in the absence of armed conflict.
When cyber operations are merely one aspect of an ongoing armed conflict,
they must comport with the IHL applicable to that category of armed conflict. For
instance, because the conflict between Russia and Georgia was international in
character, the ensuing cyber operations were subject to the law of international
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armed conflict. Any operations qualifying as attacks under that body of law would,
if directed at civilians, constitute violations of IHL and war crimes.
The difficult case involves cyber operations that take place in the absence of
kinetic hostilities. Can they constitute an armed conflict, and, if so, what type? Un-
fortunately, IHL treaty law does not define the phrase “armed conflict” per se.
Rather, it only expands on the two subcategories of armed conflict, international
and non-international armed conflict.
As to international armed conflict, Common Article 2 to the four 1949 Geneva
Conventions is traditionally viewed as the proper articulation of the scope of inter-
national armed conflict: “all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict
which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties.”67 In ex-
plaining the article’s reach, the ICRC’s commentary thereon notes that
[a]ny difference arising between two States and leading to the intervention of members
of the armed forces is an armed conflict within the meaning of Article 2, even if one of
the Parties denies the existence of a state of war. It makes no difference how long the
conflict lasts, how much slaughter takes place, or how numerous are the participating
forces.68
The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has like-
wise opined that “an armed conflict exists whenever there is resort to force between
States.”69
This threshold must not be confused with that of an “armed attack,” the condi-
tion precedent for acts in self-defense under the jus ad bellum.70 The International
Court of Justice (ICJ) described armed attacks in the Nicaragua case as involving
certain “scale and effects,” which excluded “a mere frontier incident.”71 Under
IHL, however, an “international armed conflict” commences whenever an armed
exchange between States occurs, regardless of the scale and effects of the hostilities.
Applied to cyber operations, it is clear that any operation by or attributable to a
State that results in damage to or destruction of objects or injury to or death of in-
dividuals of another State would commence an international armed conflict. This
is because they constitute attacks under IHL. More problematic from a classifica-
tion of conflict point of view are cyber operations causing no damage or injury, but
instead merely inconvenience, disruption, disorder or irritation. The results of
such operations might nevertheless be severe, as in significant interference with the
economy, transportation system or other critical infrastructure.
One possibility is to limit international armed conflict to situations in which
“attacks” have occurred. Since attacks are “acts of violence,”72 doing so would
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with the ICRC Commentary’s reference to intervention by the armed forces. Al-
though uncontested occupation and detention also constitute armed conflict while
harming neither persons nor objects,73 they both rely on the possibility of enforce-
ment through the use of force. By this interpretation, non-destructive computer
network exploitation, espionage, denial of service attacks and other invasive but
non-destructive cyber operations would not initiate an armed conflict. The di-
lemma is that in practice States targeted by non-destructive, yet otherwise severe,
attacks might treat the operations as armed conflict that justified, for instance, ki-
netic attacks on their enemies’ military objectives and combatants.
A second possibility for classification of events involving cyber operations is one
based on the more liberal Dörmann definition of attacks, which includes opera-
tions targeting civilians and civilian objects irrespective of whether they were phys-
ically damaged or injured. Because directing operations against protected persons
or objects constitutes an attack by this interpretation, an international armed con-
flict would commence once a State or those under its control launched them. How-
ever, the position is arguably over-inclusive in that by focusing on the target of an
operation, it has no means to distinguish non-destructive “attacks” from non-
destructive military operations that fail to qualify as attacks, such as lawful psycho-
logical operations directed at the civilian population.
Both approaches have merit, the former in its fidelity to received understand-
ings of IHL, the latter in that it would respond to concerns that the traditional un-
derstanding is under-inclusive since it admits of highly disruptive cyber operations
to which IHL would not apply. As it stands, though, the former represents lex lata,
the latter lex ferenda.
A major complication is the current prevalence of cyber operations by non-
State actors, as in the case of the Georgia-Russia conflict. Such actions will typically
take on the character of the kinetic conflict under way and be dealt with by the rele-
vant rules of targeting, especially those governing direct participation by civilians
in hostilities. However, a classification dilemma arises when cyber operations are
conducted by non-State actors in the absence of related kinetic operations.
The issue of attribution of a non-State actor’s acts to a State is complex. The tra-
ditional test was set forth by the International Court of Justice in the Nicaragua
case. There, the Court articulated the “effective control” test. It held that
United States participation, even if preponderant or decisive, in the financing, organiz-
ing, training, supplying and equipping of the contras [Nicaraguan guerrillas], the selec-
tion of its military or paramilitary targets, and the planning of the whole of its
operation, is still insufficient . . . for the purpose of attributing to the United States the
acts committed by the contras . . . . All the forms of United States participation men-
tioned above, and even the general control by the respondent State over a force with a
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high degree of dependency on it, would not in themselves mean, without further evi-
dence, that the United States directed or enforced the perpetration of the acts contrary
to human rights and humanitarian law alleged by the applicant State. Such acts could
well be committed by members of the contras without the control of the United States.
For this conduct to give rise to legal responsibility of the United States, it would in
principle have to be proved that that State had effective control of the military or para-
military operations in the course of which the alleged violations were committed.74
This test was reaffirmed by the Court in the Congo and Genocide cases.75 However,
although the test is often cited with regard to conflict classification, the actual issue
in Nicaragua was State responsibility for alleged actions of the contras.
By contrast, the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY dealt with the issue of conflict
classification directly in Tadic. Explicitly rejecting the effective control test, it held
that the authority of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia over the Bosnian Serb armed
groups “required by international law for considering the armed conflict to be in-
ternational was overall control going beyond the mere financing and equipping of
such forces and involving also participation in the planning and supervision of
military operations.”76
The debate over the applicable standard remains unsettled. Nevertheless, there
is no question but that a State may be responsible for the actions of non-State ac-
tors and that such responsibility may result in the existence of an international
armed conflict. Therefore, when a State directs particular cyber attacks by non-
State actors (Nicaragua) or (perhaps) participates in general planning and supervi-
sion (Tadic) of such attacks, an international armed conflict comes into being be-
tween the target State and the State exercising control over the attackers. By
contrast, no armed conflict commences when a State simply tolerates or sympa-
thizes with cyber attacks emanating from its territory, although the State may be in
breach of its international legal obligation to “police” its territory to ensure it is not
used to the detriment of other States.77
Determining whether a cyber operation conducted in the absence of kinetic
operations comprises non-international armed conflict is more challenging still.
Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions styles non-international armed
conflicts as those that are “not of an international character.”78 Specifically, non-
international armed conflict is that which occurs between a State and organized
armed groups or between such groups. Two criteria exist—organization and
intensity.
Organization has been dealt with earlier with regard to qualification as an orga-
nized armed group vis-à-vis the rules of direct participation. The criterion would
rule out any attacks mounted by either individual “hackers” or groups of hackers
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Such attacks would therefore be governed by domestic criminal law and human
rights norms, not IHL. As to “virtually” organized groups, the analysis set forth
above would apply. To the extent the group in question qualified as an organized
armed group, the first criterion for non-international armed conflict would be met.
Non-international armed conflicts must also evidence a certain degree of inten-
sity. Unlike international armed conflict, non-international armed conflict re-
quires more than mere limited hostilities. In particular, “internal disturbances and
tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a
similar nature” are excluded from the ambit of such conflict.79 According to the
ICTY in the Tadic case, non-international armed conflicts involve “protracted
armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or
between such groups within a State,”80 a definition embraced by the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and present in the Statute of the International
Criminal Court.81
This criterion would keep most cyber attacks (in the absence of kinetic opera-
tions) from qualifying as non-international armed conflict. In particular, the pro-
tracted requirement would rule out individual or sporadic attacks irrespective of
their destructiveness. Moreover, non-destructive cyber operations would, as dis-
cussed, be unlikely to even qualify as armed conflict at all. Given the intensity crite-
rion, they certainly would not with regard to non-international armed conflict.
The result is that cyber attacks conducted against a State must be quite intense be-
fore constituting a non-international armed conflict.
It should finally be noted that, although Additional Protocol II also addresses
non-international armed conflict for States party thereto, it only applies when an
organized armed group involved in the conflict “exercise[s] such control over a
part of” a State’s territory that it can “carry out sustained and concerted military
operations.”82 Obviously, a group conducting solely cyber operations against a
State would fail to meet this requirement.
Concluding Thoughts
This article has but scratched the surface of the many problematic issues surround-
ing application of IHL to cyber operations. Three were singled out for attention
and of these none was fully resolved. The dilemma is that IHL was crafted during a
period in which the cyber operations were but science fiction. However, today no
modern military enters the battlespace without at least some reliance on comput-
ers and computer networks. For the modern military, cyber capabilities represent
both force multipliers and vulnerabilities. And as demonstrated in the case of the
Georgia-Russia conflict, civilian cyber assets are an especially attractive target set,
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not only for militaries, but also for individuals or groups intent on involvement in
the conflict in question.
IHL must respond to the challenges posed by this new technology. The past de-
cade has witnessed numerous efforts, in particular by the Naval War College, to
identify challenges posed by cyber warfare to the extant norms of IHL, and to inter-
national law more generally.83 Today, practitioners and scholars are increasingly
sensitive to the challenges, such as those set forth in this article, of applying IHL to
cyber operations.84 Hopefully, the next decade will witness their resolution by the
legal, operational and policy communities.
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